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TAX RECOGNITION 
BARRY CUSHMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Trusts and Estates is my favorite course to teach. Much of the doctrinal 
material covered is immediately seen by the students as intensely and 
gratifyingly practical and relevant, often in a very personal way. The cases we 
discuss frequently weave stories illustrating various and recurrent foibles in 
human behavior, and evoke a wide range of emotional responses. Students 
often find that they enjoy the course much more than they had anticipated that 
they would. Indeed, one of the pleasures of teaching Trusts and Estates is that 
the students’ expectations upon entering the course are so low that it is hard 
not to exceed them. 
It often happens that students with newly-discovered interests in estate 
planning and probate will stop by my office to ask questions about a career in 
that area of practice. Most of the time students eventually will ask whether one 
would be required to know much about tax law. Often I can tell from the looks 
on their faces that they are hoping that I will say no, but that deep down they 
know that the answer is yes. For some, this confirmation of their fears is a 
conversation-stopper. Others are more easily soothed, and some respond to this 
revelation without dismay. But the fact of the matter is that very few law 
students take a separate course on the federal transfer taxes. 
At the Notre Dame Law School, where I now teach, the average 
enrollment in Trusts and Estates over the past eight years has been ninety, 
which is roughly half of each graduating class.1 The average enrollment in 
Estate and Gift Taxation, by contrast, has been seventeen, which is less than 
ten percent of the class.2 Notre Dame is hardly unusual in this regard. I 
 
* John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. Thanks to Dan Kelly, 
Michael Kirsch, and Bill LaPiana for helpful comments, and to Dwight King for tracking down 
an elusive quotation. 
 1. E-mail from Anne Hamilton, Registrar, Notre Dame Law School, to Barry Cushman, 
John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School (Apr. 22, 2013, 11:36 
AM) (on file with author); J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME LAW SCH., 
http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlaw/consumer-info/Std509InfoReport.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
 2. E-mail from Anne Hamilton, Registrar, Notre Dame Law School, to Barry Cushman, 
John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School (Apr. 22, 2013, 11:36 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
826 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:825 
formerly taught at the University of Virginia, which has a student body 
approximately twice as large as that of Notre Dame.3 During the 2013–2014 
academic year, 187 Virginia students enrolled in Trusts and Estates,4 while 
only four enrolled in the course on Federal Taxation of Gratuitous Transfers.5 
Though I do not have precise data from prior years, those proportions roughly 
comport with my recollection of the pattern of enrollment at Virginia from 
1998 to 2012. While a substantial percentage of law students take the basic 
course in Trusts and Estates, only a very small percentage follow up with a 
course in Federal Estate and Gift Tax. 
This means that the basic course in Trusts and Estates provides our only 
opportunity to expose most of our students to some of the basic features of our 
transfer tax system. One might assume that anyone with sufficient wealth to be 
subject to the federal transfer taxes will engage specialized counsel who is 
sophisticated in these matters. In my experience, and in the experience of 
colleagues with whom I have discussed this issue, that assumption too often 
proves to be false. General practitioners are asked to draft wills and trusts for 
affluent clients, and even lawyers specializing in some other area of practice 
may occasionally be asked to draft a will for a friend or family member. A lack 
of familiarity with the outlines of the transfer tax system may cause such 
lawyers to overlook simple methods of tax savings and to commit costly errors. 
Moreover, certain provisions of the federal income tax can have significant 
estate planning consequences even for people whose estates will not be subject 
to the federal estate tax. Fortunately, the casebook that I use contains a number 
of decisions in which such tax issues appear just below the surface. I therefore 
try to take the occasional opportunity presented by these cases to introduce 
some basic tax concepts and planning strategies. 
I have been using the Dukeminier casebook since I began teaching Trusts 
and Estates in 1992. The examples that I use in this article therefore are drawn 
from that text, though I have no doubt that other casebooks provide 
comparable illustrations. The cases that I discuss offer occasions to introduce 
features of each of the four relevant systems of federal taxation: the estate tax; 
 
AM) (on file with author); J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME LAW SCH., 
http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlaw/consumer-info/Std509InfoReport.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
 3. J.D. Enrollment and Ethnicity, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME LAW SCH., http://www3.nd.edu/ 
~ndlaw/consumer-info/Std509InfoReport.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2013); J.D. Enrollment and 
Ethnicity, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/about/aba_fall2012.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
 4. Current Courses: Fall 2013, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://lawnotes2.law.virginia. 
edu/lawweb/course.nsf/CBTBN?Openview&Expand=1#1 (last visited Dec. 10, 2013); Current 
Courses: Spring 2014, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://lawnotes2.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/ 
course.nsf/CBTBN?Openview&Expand=3#3 (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
 5. Current Courses: Fall 2013, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://lawnotes2.law.virginia. 
edu/lawweb/course.nsf/CBTBN?Openview&Expand=1#1 (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] TAX RECOGNITION 827 
the gift tax; the generation-skipping transfer tax; and the income tax. I take 
each of these in turn. 
I.  THE ESTATE TAX 
A. Marital Deduction Planning 
I often tell my students that if they read a case and cannot understand why 
a particular disposition was structured in a particular fashion, then the chances 
are good that the form of the disposition was driven by tax considerations with 
which they are not familiar. In re Estate of Clarkson v. First National Bank of 
Omaha6 is just such a case. Clarkson appeared in the third through the sixth 
editions of the casebook, and though it has disappeared from more recent 
editions, I continue to teach it. The case concerns the right of an incompetent 
surviving spouse to take her elective share against her deceased spouse’s will.7 
At the time Mr. Clarkson executed his will, his second wife had been 
incompetent for four years, and had no realistic prospect of restoration to 
competency.8 Mr. Clarkson’s will created a testamentary trust funded by one-
fourth of his estate, from which Mrs. Clarkson was to be paid all of the 
income.9 The trustee was given power to invade principal to the extent it 
deemed such invasion necessary or desirable to provide for Mrs. Clarkson’s 
support and maintenance.10 In addition, the trust conferred upon Mrs. Clarkson 
a testamentary general power of appointment over the remainder.11 
The relevant Nebraska statute provided that the court should order an 
election against the will of a deceased spouse on behalf of an incompetent 
surviving spouse where such an election would be in the “best interests” of the 
surviving spouse.12 The specific issue confronting the Nebraska Supreme 
Court was how to interpret that statutory standard.13 Many courts would take 
into account a variety of surrounding facts and circumstances in making the 
“best interests” determination, including whether the surviving spouse would 
have wanted to abide by the deceased spouse’s estate plan.14 The Nebraska 
court instead adopted the minority view, which asks only whether the amount 
that the surviving spouse would take by electing against the will is of greater 
pecuniary value than the amount provided for in the will.15 
 
 6. In re Estate of Clarkson v. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, 226 N.W.2d 334 (Neb. 1975). 
 7. Id. at 335. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 335–36. 
 10. Id. at 336. 
 11. In re Estate of Clarkson, 226 N.W.2d at 336. 
 12. Id. at 336–37. 
 13. Id. at 336. 
 14. Id. at 338. 
 15. Id. at 337–38. 
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Though the case is nominally about the standard to be applied in 
determining whether to order an election against a deceased spouse’s will on 
behalf of an incompetent surviving spouse, it also provides an opportunity to 
introduce the students to some of the basics of marital deduction planning. The 
Clarkson majority observed that “[t]he will was made at a time when Mrs. 
Clarkson was incompetent. There is no possibility of her exercising the power 
of appointment granted in the will because her condition cannot improve.”16 
The perceptive student will wonder why Mr. Clarkson conferred upon his wife 
a power that he knew that she could not and never would be able to exercise. 
Was he mocking his poor wife? Did he think that he was being funny? 
Students are relieved to know that there is a more benign explanation for 
Mr. Clarkson’s otherwise mysterious behavior. In giving his wife a 
testamentary general power of appointment over the remainder of the trust, he 
was seeking to qualify the bequest to the trust for the estate tax marital 
deduction.17 Many students will already know that there is such a thing as the 
marital estate and gift tax deduction, but this account of Mr. Clarkson’s actions 
presents an occasion to introduce the use of split-interest trusts in marital 
deduction planning. Students may not understand—and they need to 
understand—that the marital deduction merely provides a strategy for estate 
tax deferral. Of course, to the extent that an outright marital bequest has not 
been consumed by the surviving spouse, its value will be included in the 
surviving spouse’s gross estate at death. But one cannot both take the marital 
deduction and avoid such subsequent inclusion in the surviving spouse’s estate 
simply by giving the surviving spouse a life estate—which, at the moment after 
her death, has, for estate tax inclusion purposes, an actuarial value of zero—
with a remainder to third parties.18 The federal estate tax law does not permit 
the estate of the first to die to claim a marital deduction in such a case unless 
the marital bequest has been made in a form that will require any unconsumed 
portion of those assets to be included in the gross estate of the surviving 
spouse. 
At the time Mr. Clarkson drafted his will in 1969, there were basically two 
ways to do this. One was an “estate trust,” leaving a life estate to Mrs. 
Clarkson with the remainder to her estate.19 Under such a plan the remainder of 
the trust would have been disposed of by the residuary clause of Mrs. 
Clarkson’s most recent valid will, or if there were none, to her intestate 
 
 16. In re Estate of Clarkson, 226 N.W.2d at 336. 
 17. Justice McCown’s dissenting opinion notes generally that the trust was drafted in order 
to qualify the bequest to the trust for the estate tax marital deduction, but does not explain the role 
that the testamentary general power of appointment played in that qualification. Id. at 339 
(McCown, J., dissenting). 
 18. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1) (2006). 
 19. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2056(c)-2(b)(1) (2013); Rev. Rul. 68-554, 1968-2 I.R.B. 412–13. 
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successors, who were a son and a daughter by a prior marriage.20 Mr. Clarkson, 
who wanted the bulk of the remainder to go to his two daughters from a prior 
marriage, therefore exercised the second option: a trust conferring upon his 
incompetent wife a life estate in all of the income and a testamentary general 
power of appointment over the remainder, with the bulk of the remainder to 
pass in default of appointment to his two daughters.21 Conferring upon Mrs. 
Clarkson such a power of appointment would result in the inclusion of the 
value of the remainder in her gross estate under I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2).22 Mr. 
Clarkson neither wanted nor expected Mrs. Clarkson to exercise the power. 
The sole reason for its inclusion was to qualify for the marital deduction. 
The students naturally will recognize that this estate plan could work for 
Mr. Clarkson only because Mrs. Clarkson was incompetent and could not 
exercise her testamentary power of appointment in favor of her own children.23 
Had Mrs. Clarkson been competent, Mr. Clarkson would have had to trust her 
not to exercise the power in a way that frustrated his wishes. Here, however, 
one can explain that, had Mr. Clarkson written his will after 1981, he probably 
would have created a split-interest trust qualifying for the marital deduction in 
which Mrs. Clarkson was given no power to dispose of the remainder. Under 
I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B), enacted in 1981, Mr. Clarkson could have created a 
Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP) trust, providing for all of the 
income to go to Mrs. Clarkson for her life, with the remainder to pass to his 
children.24 In order to qualify for the marital deduction, Mr. Clarkson’s 
executor would have to make an irrevocable QTIP election on the estate tax 
return,25 which would result in the inclusion in Mrs. Clarkson’s gross estate of 
the value of the trust’s remainder at the date of her death.26 
Of course, split-interest marital deduction planning—and especially QTIP 
planning—requires the estate planner to be mindful of a series of technical 
requirements that must be satisfied in order to qualify for the marital 
deduction. Though students in a Trusts and Estates course need to be made 
 
 20. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2056(c)-2(b)(1); Rev. Rul. 68-554, 1968-2 I.R.B. 412. 
 21. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5). 
 22. Id. at § 2041(a)(2). The estate plan involved in In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332, 
334–35 (N.Y. 1997), a case concerning the trustee’s duty to diversify taken up in the materials on 
the fiduciary obligation, provides an opportunity to reinforce this point. See JESSE DUKEMINIER 
& ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 626 (9th ed. 2013). 
 23. And, in fact, even under these circumstances Mr. Clarkson’s desires were frustrated. The 
court ordered the election, which resulted in the unconsumed assets passing not to Mr. Clarkson’s 
remainder beneficiaries, but instead to the beneficiaries of Mrs. Clarkson’s estate. This would not 
be the case under the Uniform Probate Code. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-203, 2-212, 2-202 
(amended 2010). 
 24. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B). 
 25. Id. at § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v). 
 26. See id. at § 2044. 
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generally aware of the existence of such requirements, dilation upon their 
details is better confided to a course on the federal transfer taxes. Nevertheless, 
Clarkson—a case included in the text for purposes of illuminating divergent 
approaches to the issue of elective shares for incompetent surviving spouses—
opens up opportunities to introduce students to the basics of split-interest 
marital deduction planning, and to alert them to the dangers awaiting those 
who engage in such planning without thoroughly familiarizing themselves with 
the technical requirements for securing the marital deduction. 
Clymer v. Mayo27 first appeared in the fourth edition of the casebook and 
has been included, albeit now in quite truncated form, in every succeeding 
edition. The case concerns the effect of divorce upon a disposition made in a 
revocable living trust in favor of a former spouse.28 In 1973, Clara Mayo 
executed an unfunded revocable living trust and a pour-over will leaving the 
bulk of her estate to the trust.29 Mrs. Mayo also made the trust the beneficiary 
of her retirement plan and a group life insurance policy acquired through her 
employer.30 The trust provisions in turn created two subtrusts.31 Trust A was to 
be funded with one-half of Mrs. Mayo’s adjusted gross estate for federal estate 
tax purposes.32 Mrs. Mayo’s husband, James Mayo, was given the right to the 
income from Trust A, the right to invade the principal, and a general power of 
appointment over the remainder.33 The balance of the trust assets were to pass 
to Trust B, which, after making a series of specific bequests, left a life estate in 
the remaining assets to Mr. Mayo, with the remainder passing to third parties.34 
In 1978 Clara and James divorced, but the settlement agreement made no 
reference to Mr. Mayo’s interest in the trusts.35 Clara died in 1981 without 
having amended the trust to remove James as a beneficiary, and the 
administrator of her estate petitioned for instructions concerning the effect of 
the divorce on the estate’s administration.36 The court held that the divorce had 
the effect of revoking all of the trust dispositions in favor of Mr. Mayo.37 
Like Clarkson, Clymer v. Mayo provides an opportunity to introduce 
students to some of the basics of marital deduction planning. Here again, as in 
Clarkson, the surviving spouse was given a life estate with a general power of 
 
 27. Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1985). 
 28. Id. at 1087–88. 
 29. Id. at 1087. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Clymer, 473 N.E.2d at 1087. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1087–88. 
 37. Clymer, 473 N.E.2d at 1095–96. 
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appointment in order to secure the marital deduction for a split-interest trust.38 
The full text of the Mayo opinion makes it clear that Trust A was designed to 
qualify for the marital deduction,39 and one can explain to the students that at 
the time Mrs. Mayo executed her will and trust, one-half of the adjusted gross 
estate was the maximum amount that one could deduct for a bequest to a 
surviving spouse.40 One can then explain that in 1981, Congress revised the 
law to make the marital deduction unlimited in value.41 One can now leave 
one’s entire estate to one’s surviving spouse and pay no estate tax on the 
bequest.42 Students may momentarily think that this revision to the estate tax 
law has made the type of A-B trust planning employed in Mayo obsolete. After 
1981, Mrs. Mayo simply could have left as much of her estate to Trust A as 
she liked and taken the full deduction for that amount. There would be no 
reason to create Trust B. 
Here is the opportunity to explain to the students why the A-B trust 
continues to serve as the template for most marital deduction planning. In 
1981, Congress also introduced into the estate tax the unified credit, which 
now stands at $5,000,000 per person, indexed for inflation.43 Between 1981 
and 2010, the unified credit was non-transferable.44 If one failed to use it in its 
entirety, the unused portion of the credit was forfeited. Estate planners 
therefore regularly established two trusts for the benefit of the surviving 
spouse. One was a “credit shelter” or “bypass” trust, which was funded with an 
amount equivalent to the portion of the deceased spouse’s unified credit not 
previously used to offset gift tax liability. The surviving spouse could be given 
a right to income and limited access to principal in such a credit shelter trust, 
but upon the death of the surviving spouse, the trust assets would not be 
included in her gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. They would pass to 
the remainder beneficiaries free of federal estate tax. The balance of the 
deceased spouse’s assets would fund the marital deduction trust—typically a 
QTIP trust. The surviving spouse would be given all of the income from the 
trust and perhaps some access to principal, but at her death the value of the 
remaining trust assets would be included in her gross estate.45 
 
 38. Id. at 1087. 
 39. Id. at 1091. 
 40. See id. at 1087 (the will and trust were executed on February 2, 1973); I.R.C. § 2056(c) 
(1970) (showing the law in effect at the time of Mrs. Mayo’s will and trust). 
 41. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172, 301 
(1981). 
 42. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2006). 
 43. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3301 (2010). 
 44. I.R.C. § 2010 (1982). 
 45. I.R.C. § 2044 (2006). The estate plan involved in Howard v. Howard, 156 P.3d 89 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2007), a case concerning the trustee’s duty of impartiality taken up in the materials on 
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In 2010, Congress enacted legislation making the unified credit portable in 
some circumstances. A surviving spouse now can use any unconsumed portion 
of her deceased spouse’s unified credit to shelter her own estate’s assets from 
the estate tax (though if she has been widowed more than once, she can use 
only the unconsumed credit of the spouse by whom she was most recently 
widowed).46 This change in the tax law reduces—though it does not 
eliminate—the incentive to use one’s own unified credit lest it be lost. But 
there is another feature of marital deduction planning that will continue to 
create incentives to maximize one’s use of the unified credit in the estate of the 
first to die. Recall that the marital deduction is merely a deferral mechanism—
any unconsumed portion of the marital deduction trust will be included in the 
gross estate of the surviving spouse, at the value of the trust assets on the date 
of the surviving spouse’s death. The estate tax value of the credit shelter trust 
assets, by contrast, is fixed at the date of the death of the first to die, and is not 
included in the surviving spouse’s gross estate. Because the credit shelter 
bequest thus “freezes” the estate tax value of those assets, any appreciation in 
their actual value between the death of the first to die and the death of the 
surviving spouse will escape estate taxation at the couple’s generational level. 
For this and for other reasons, the A-B trust scheme of marital deduction 
planning remains relevant today, and thus remains worthy of classroom 
discussion. 
Finally, an introduction to the relationship between the unified credit and 
the marital deduction provides an opportunity to explain to students why a 
beneficiary without significant actual or foreseeable creditors might disclaim 
all or part of a substantial bequest. Students can readily understand why a 
beneficiary might disclaim property she does not wish to own, such as Aunt 
Minnie’s thimble collection, or Uncle Fred’s Superfund site.47 But they often 
have a harder time understanding why someone might disclaim a substantial 
bequest of cash or stock. Once they understand the concept of an over-funded 
marital bequest, however, they can see why a surviving spouse might disclaim 
a portion of an outright marital bequest so as to utilize the deceased spouse’s 
unified credit. And they can further comprehend why a decedent’s will or trust 
might provide that any portion of the marital bequest disclaimed by the 
surviving spouse shall pass to a contingent credit shelter trust.48 
 
the fiduciary obligation, presents an opportunity to revisit the use of the A-B trust format in 
marital deduction planning. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 658. 
 46. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(4). 
 47. But see Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999) (disclaimer valid for purposes of 
state law not effective to exempt inherited property from federal tax lien imposed upon 
beneficiary); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 142. 
 48. See, e.g., RONALD A. BRAND & WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, DISCLAIMERS IN ESTATE 
PLANNING: A GUIDE TO THEIR EFFECTIVE USE 125–26 (1990). 
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B. Charitable Deduction Planning 
Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hospital49 appeared in the fourth 
and fifth editions of the casebook. The case was included to illustrate 
traditional limitations on the power of courts to cure drafting mistakes made by 
the scrivener of a will.50 Justice Ellen Ash Peters filed a powerful dissent to the 
majority opinion, arguing for a more liberal policy of relief for such 
mistakes.51 Justice Peters’s dissent later was vindicated by the court in 
Erickson v. Erickson,52 and that decision replaced Sharon Hospital in more 
recent editions of the casebook. I have had the students read Erickson, but I 
continue to teach them Sharon Hospital, in large part because it provides an 
opportunity to alert them to some dangers in charitable deduction planning. 
The facts of Sharon Hospital are as follows: In 1960, the testator executed 
a will in which he established a type of split-interest trust commonly called a 
charitable remainder trust.53 The income was to be used for the benefit of a 
designated individual for life, with the remainder to pass to seven named 
charitable institutions (the 1960 charities).54 In 1969, the testator executed a 
codicil eliminating the remainder interests of six of the seven 1960 charities, 
and substituting in their place ten new charitable institutions (the 1969 
charities).55 Later in 1969, Congress amended the estate tax law to require that 
bequests of remainder interests to charities be made in a specified manner in 
order to qualify for the estate tax charitable deduction.56 The testator learned of 
this change in 1975 and instructed his attorney to amend the will and codicil so 
that the bequests to the 1969 charities would qualify for the charitable 
deduction.57 The lawyer drafted a second codicil qualifying the remainder 
interests for the charitable deduction, but mistakenly reinstated the 1960 
charities as the remainder beneficiaries.58 The testator signed the 1975 codicil 
and died in 1979 before the mistake had been identified.59 The 1969 charities 
sought relief for the scrivener’s error, but a sharply divided Connecticut 
 
 49. Conn. Junior Republic v. Sharon Hospital, 448 A.2d 190 (Conn. 1982). 
 50. Id. at 191. 
 51. Id. at 200 (Peters, J., dissenting). 
 52. See Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92, 98 (Conn. 1998). 
 53. Sharon Hospital, 448 A.2d at 191. A trust in which a charity is given a term of years or 
an estate pur autre vie followed by a remainder to private parties is commonly known as a 
charitable lead trust. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 191–92. 
 56. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201, 83 Stat. 487, 566 (1969). 
 57. Sharon Hospital, 448 A.2d at 192. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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Supreme Court followed the then-standard practice of refusing to admit 
extrinsic evidence of mistake, and affirmed the denials of the relief requested.60 
The change to the tax law involved in Sharon Hospital was motivated by 
concerns that trustees of charitable lead and charitable remainder trusts were 
manipulating investment policy in order to provide those holding the private 
interests with greater benefits than might have been anticipated, at the expense 
of the charitable interests. The trustee of a charitable lead trust might invest 
heavily in assets having significant growth potential but providing little income 
to the charity; the trustee of a charitable remainder trust might invest in assets 
that produced significant income for the private life tenant but grew at below-
market rates. These investment practices could result in the estate taking a 
larger charitable deduction than was warranted by the value ultimately 
received by the charitable beneficiary.61 To prevent such abuses, the 1969 
Congress enacted legislation providing that split-interest charitable trusts 
would not qualify for the charitable deduction unless they took the form of an 
annuity trust, a unitrust, or a pooled income fund.62 The requirements imposed 
by the statute and regulations are quite technical—so technical, in fact, that in 
1988 the Service began to take the unusual step of issuing Revenue Procedures 
containing model dispositive provisions.63 
I do not work through these technical requirements with students in a basic 
Trusts and Estates course. But after explaining to them the tax problem 
involved in Sharon Hospital, I tell them that there is one very important lesson 
that I want them to take away from the case: you do not know how to do this. 
You may think that you can set up a trust providing for a life estate to a private 
party and a remainder to a charity, and then take a charitable estate tax 
deduction for the actuarial value of the remainder. You would be mistaken and 
that will occasion some unhappiness with you.64 If you have a client who 
wants to establish such a trust, you need either to learn how to do this or to 
direct the client to someone who does know how to do it. 
 
 60. Id. at 199. 
 61. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 58 (1969). 
 62. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2) (2006); I.R.C. § 2522(c)(2). 
 63. See Rev. Procs. 88-53, 1988-2 C.B. 712; 89-20, 1989-1 C.B. 841; 89-21, 1989-1 C.B. 
842; 90-30, 1990-1 C.B. 534; 90-31, 1990-1 C.B. 539; 90-32, 1990-1 C.B. 546; 2003-53, 2003-2 
C.B. 230; 2003-54, 2003-2 C.B. 236; 2003-55, 2003-2 C.B. 242; 2003-56, 2003-2 C.B. 249; 
2003-57, 2003-2 C.B. 257; 2003-58, 2003-2 C.B. 262; 2003-59, 2003-2 C. B. 268; 2003-60, 
2003-2 C.B. 274; 2005-52, 2005-2 C.B. 326; 2005-53, 2005-2 C.B. 339; 2005-54, 2005-2 C.B. 
353; 2005-55, 2005-2 C.B. 367; 2005-56, 2005-2 C.B. 383; 2005-57, 2005-2 C.B. 392; 2005-58, 
2005-2 C.B. 402; 2005-59, 2005-2 C.B. 412; 2007-45, 2007-2 C.B. 89; 2007-46, 2007-2 C.B. 
102; 2008-45, 2008-2 C.B. 224; 2008-46, 2008-2 C.B. 238. 
 64. The deduction may be salvaged, however, through a reformation proceeding, provided 
that the requirements of I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3) (or I.R.C. § 2522(c)(4), as the case may be) can be 
and are satisfied. Clearly, an after-the-fact reformation proceeding to achieve tax savings that 
might have been obtained in the first place through competent drafting is a second-best solution. 
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C. Additional Opportunities 
The Dukeminier casebook also offers other opportunities to make more 
discrete points about estate taxation. For example, in the section on 
disclaimers, the text helpfully notes that a beneficiary may disclaim a bequest 
to save on inheritance and income taxes.65 Suppose, for example, that T were 
to leave property to his sister, A. A intends to leave all of her substantial estate 
to her only child, B. If A accepts the bequest from T, then the value of that 
property, to the extent that it is not consumed during A’s life, will be subject to 
estate taxation in A’s estate.66 However, if A executes a valid, qualified 
disclaimer of the property, B will take the property under the state’s anti-lapse 
statute, and the property will not be taxed in A’s estate. Moreover, if B is in a 
lower income tax bracket than A is, the burden of taxation on income 
generated by the disclaimed property accordingly will be lower.67 
Similarly, in the section on future interests, the text usefully observes that 
federal estate taxation of a future interest does not turn on whether that interest 
is vested or contingent, but instead on whether it is transmissible.68 Contingent 
future interests passing from a decedent thus can result in the imposition of 
estate taxation. When discussing reversions, one can note that the value of a 
property interest transferred during life by the decedent may be subject to 
taxation in his gross estate if he has retained a significant reversionary interest 
in the property.69 And when discussing adult adoption, one can observe that 
some states have inheritance taxes that peg the rate of taxation to the proximity 
of the relationship between the decedent and the beneficiary,70 and that 
adoption of a non-relative can thus reduce the burden of inheritance taxation 
on the bequest. 
Finally, the materials on nonprobate transfers and the elective share 
provide opportunities to introduce students to the basic federal estate tax 
treatment of death-time transfers passing outside of probate.71 Students should 
 
 65. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 140. 
 66. Depending upon how soon after T’s death A dies, the burden of taxation may to some 
extent be reduced by the Credit for Tax on Prior Transfers. See I.R.C. § 2013. 
 67. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND ESTATES 153 (8th ed. 2009). 
 68. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 849. 
 69. I.R.C. § 2037(a)(2). 
 70. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §140.070 (West 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2004, 
77-2005 (2006); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 18:26-2.5, 18:26-2.7, 18:26-2.8 (1994); see also 
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 977–78 (discussing state estate and inheritance taxes). 
For another opportunity to discuss issues of state taxation, see id. at 741 (citing Davis v. U.S. 
Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 243 S.W.3d 425, 426, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007), in which beneficiaries of a 
trust successfully sought to replace a Missouri trustee with a Delaware trustee, in part to reduce 
state-level income taxation). 
 71. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 435–93, 512–45. 
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understand that, while property passing at death under a revocable trust, joint 
tenancy, multiple-party bank or brokerage account, life insurance policy, 
pension account, and the like avoids the delays, expense, and publicity of 
probate, it does not escape federal estate taxation. If it did, then the annual 
revenue from the federal transfer taxes presumably would approach zero. 
Instead, the federal estate tax contains a series of provisions designed to 
include the value of such property in the decedent’s gross estate.72 The 
Uniform Probate Code, various state statutes, and some judicially-created 
doctrines follow a similar approach in seeking to prevent a spouse from 
unfairly depleting the value of the estate subject to his surviving spouse’s 
elective share by disposing of much or all of his wealth through various forms 
of nonprobate transfer.73 Instead, the Uniform Probate Code74 and New York’s 
Estates Powers & Trusts Law,75 for example, include in the “augmented estate” 
subject to the elective share many of the types of nonprobate assets that would 
be included in the decedent’s gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. And 
Delaware’s elective share statute elegantly includes in the augmented estate the 
value of all of the assets includible in the decedent’s federal gross estate, 
irrespective of whether an estate tax return is filed.76 
Each of these points is worthy of at least a brief mention. But the most 
important areas to emphasize, in my judgment, are those in which the students 
are most likely to make costly mistakes in law practice—the marital and 
charitable deductions. 
II.  THE GIFT TAX 
The most important things for students to understand about the gift tax are: 
(1) that it exists; (2) that it is offset by the unified credit, the marital deduction, 
and the charitable deduction;77 (3) that transfers made on behalf of an 
individual directly to qualifying educational organizations and providers of 
medical care are excluded from the tax base under I.R.C. § 2503(e);78 (4) that 
annual gifts of up to $13,000 per donee (indexed for inflation) are excluded 
from the tax base under I.R.C. § 2503(b);79 and (5) that with respect to the “ed-
med” exclusion and the annual exclusion, there is no analogous provision for 
exclusion from the estate tax.80 Once they also understand that lifetime gifts 
 
 72. See I.R.C. §§ 2035–42. 
 73. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 74. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205 (amended 2010). 
 75. See N.Y. EST. POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A(b) (McKinney 1999). 
 76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 902(a) (2007). 
 77. Survivors, Executors, and Administrators, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 25 (Feb. 8, 
2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p559.pdf. 
 78. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (2006). 
 79. Id. § 2503(b). 
 80. See id. §§ 2001–2210. 
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freeze the transfer tax value of the transferred asset and thus leverage the value 
of the unified credit, students will see that our transfer tax system creates 
significant incentives for lifetime giving—something that they will no doubt 
delight in telling their parents. 
The Dukeminier casebook lends itself to a discussion of these features of 
the gift tax at various junctures. For example, the text notes that a disclaimer 
that is valid for purposes of state property law may nevertheless result in gift 
tax liability to the disclaimant unless the disclaimer also satisfies the 
requirements for a “qualified disclaimer” under I.R.C. § 2518.81 In its 
discussion of planning for incapacity, the text points out that many states 
require that any desired authority for the holder of a durable power of attorney 
to make gifts on behalf of a principal be expressly conferred in the document.82 
Thus, if the principal wishes the agent to have the authority to reduce the size 
of the principal’s taxable estate by making gifts that would qualify for the 
annual exclusion or the ed-med exclusion, the document should make that 
authority explicit. 
The annual exclusion is arguably the most important of the basic gifting 
techniques, and I introduce it quite early in the course. The Dukeminier 
casebook’s introductory materials raise questions about the practical feasibility 
of abolishing inheritance, were doing so thought desirable.83 In the seventh 
edition, the text explicitly pointed out that the abolition of inheritance would 
require the eradication not only of testate and intestate succession, but also of 
nonprobate forms of transfer such as joint tenancies; inter vivos transfers of 
remainder interests subject to a retained life estate; payable-on-death and 
transfer-on-death designations on contracts and bank, brokerage, and pension 
accounts; and life insurance.84 I continue to raise these points, adding that 
another hole in the dike that would have to be plugged of course would be 
outright inter vivos gifts. The costs of policing such donative activity 
obviously would be enormous, and those who have argued in favor of the 
annual exclusion from the gift tax sometimes have recognized this explicitly. 
As one commentator has put it, the annual exclusion’s “purpose is to ensure 
that no IRS agent is needed under the Christmas tree to monitor small gifts.”85 
 
 81. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 141. 
 82. Id. at 503. 
 83. JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 8–9 (7th ed. 2005). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Robert B. Ford, Of Counsel: Annual Exclusion a Use-or-Lose Tax Benefit, CRAIN’S 
CLEVELAND BUS., Dec. 10, 2001, at 19. See also John K. McNulty, Statement of John K. 
McNulty, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, in 10 TAX REFORM—1976: A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 (PUBLIC LAW 94-455) WITH RELATED 
AMENDMENTS 190, 194 (Bernard D. Reams & Emelyn B. House eds., 1992) (the exclusion 
ensures that “the tax authorities would not have to ‘sit beneath the Christmas tree’ or make liars 
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Students should understand that many annual exclusion gifts are made in 
trust, and that this gives rise to its own complexities. The initial challenge is 
presented by I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1)’s requirement that a gift be of a “present 
interest” in order to qualify for the annual exclusion.86 A transfer of $13,000 to 
a trust in which there are both present and future interests therefore will not 
qualify in its entirety for the annual exclusion; the value of the portion 
allocated by the terms of the trust to the future interests will be ineligible. In 
order to qualify gifts to a trust for an annual exclusion, therefore, settlors 
commonly confer upon beneficiaries “demand powers”—powers to withdraw 
from the trust a certain dollar amount or percentage of the corpus each year. 
This demand power, which confers upon the beneficiary the right to immediate 
possession of the amount subject to the power, gives the beneficiary the 
requisite present interest in the contributed property. This in turn renders the 
contribution to the trust eligible for the annual exclusion. 
This background helps the students to understand the trust involved in 
Irwin Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Long.87 Long, which has been in the 
casebook since the fourth edition, is included to illustrate the traditional 
relation-back doctrine and its bearing on the rights of a creditor of the holder of 
an inter vivos general power of appointment to reach the assets subject to the 
power in satisfaction of her claims.88 Laura Long created a trust in which she 
conferred on her son, Philip W. Long, Jr., “the right to withdraw from principal 
once in any calendar year upon thirty (30) days written notice to the Trustee up 
to four percent (4%) of the market value of the entire trust principal on the date 
of such notice, which right shall not be cumulative.”89 Philip’s ex-wife sought 
to reach four percent of the trust corpus in order to satisfy her rights under their 
divorce decree, and the Indiana court held that she could not do so unless and 
until Philip actually exercised his power.90 
Having been introduced to the present interest requirement, the students 
will now understand that Philip’s demand power was probably included to 
qualify additional contributions to the trust for the annual exclusion. But, why, 
they might wonder, was the power made non-cumulative? And why was it 
limited to four percent of the principal? 
In order for the students to understand these features of this particular 
power, they must further recognize that the conferral of such a power creates 
complications for its holder. Such a power is, of course, a general power of 
 
out of taxpayers who inadvertently or otherwise failed to report the small transfers that take place, 
particularly within a family context.”). 
 86. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1) (2006). 
 87. Irwin Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Long, 312 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974). 
 88. See id. at 909. 
 89. Id. at 910. 
 90. Id. at 909, 914. 
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appointment;91 and as the notes following the case usefully observe, the holder 
of such a power is treated as the owner for federal transfer tax purposes.92 If 
Philip exercises the power by giving the appointive property to someone else, 
he will be deemed to have made a taxable gift.93 And to the extent that Philip 
holds such a power over the appointive property at his death, the property will 
be included in his gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.94 This is why the 
power was made non-cumulative.95 As the power is written, Philip will have 
only the value of four percent of the trust principal included in his gross estate 
at death. Had the power been cumulative, then for each year in which Philip 
did not exercise the power, he would be deemed to own an increasingly larger 
percentage of the principal at his death. In order to protect Philip from this 
consequence, the power is designed to lapse in any year in which he does not 
exercise it. And, of course, most trust beneficiaries holding demand powers 
understand, or are made to understand, that they are expected to allow the 
power to lapse each year. The power is not there to be exercised—it is there to 
make the annual exclusion available to those contributing to the trust.96 
It is the fact Philip’s demand power was expected to lapse annually that 
most likely accounts for its size. I.R.C. § 2514(e) provides that the lapse of a 
power is treated as a release of the power,97 and I.R.C. § 2514(b) provides that 
the release of a power, like the exercise of power, shall be treated as a transfer 
of property.98 This means that by allowing the power to lapse, Philip would be 
treated as having made a transfer to the trust. A portion of that deemed transfer 
would be allocated to future interests and thus would not be eligible for the 
annual exclusion. Allowing the power to lapse thus would result in gift tax 
liability for Philip. In addition, depending upon what other interests or powers 
 
 91. See I.R.C. §§ 2041, 2514. 
 92. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 807. The notes also provide useful 
information on tax planning with special powers of appointment. Id. See also Beals v. State St. 
Bank & Trust Co., 326 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Mass. 1975), which immediately follows those notes, 
and provides an opportunity to make an important point about the transfer taxes. That case, which 
has been included the casebook since the third edition, is ostensibly about whether a residuary 
clause implicitly exercises a general power of appointment. But the facts allow one to note that 
one can no longer avoid the potentially adverse tax consequences associated with a general power 
by releasing only those features of the power that make it general, thereby converting it into a 
non-taxable special power of appointment. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c) (2013) (stating that a 
partial release of a general power of appointment does not effect a complete gift for Federal tax 
purposes). 
 93. I.R.C. § 2514(b). 
 94. Id. at § 2041. 
 95. See Irwin Union Bank & Trust Co., 312 N.E.2d at 910. 
 96. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8727003 (Mar. 16, 1987) for a humorous instance in which 
certain power-holders did not understand the drill. 
 97. I.R.C. § 2514(e). 
 98. Id. at § 2514(b). 
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Philip has with respect to the trust, the lapse of the power could also result in 
estate liability for Philip. Assume, for example, that Philip held a life estate in 
the trust created by his mother. I.R.C. § 2036(a) provides that the value of 
property transferred by a decedent during life in which he retained a life estate 
shall be included in his gross estate.99 I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) in turn provides for 
the inclusion of any property deemed to be transferred by exercise or release of 
a power of appointment “by a disposition which is of such nature that if it were 
a transfer of property owned by the decedent, such property would be 
includible in the decedent’s gross estate under sections 2035 to 2038, 
inclusive.”100 I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) in turn treats the lapse of a power as the 
release of a power.101 Accordingly, in any year in which Philip allowed the 
power to lapse, he would be deemed to have made a transfer of property in 
which he retained a life estate, the value of which would be includible in his 
gross estate at death. Each annual lapse would thus augment the value of the 
property ultimately included in his gross estate. 
In order to provide some relief from these potentially adverse 
consequences, I.R.C. §§ 2514(e) and 2041(b)(2) offer a limited safe harbor. 
Each of these sections provides that a lapse shall not be considered a transfer 
of property except to the extent that the amount subject to the power exceeds 
the greater of (a) $5000, or (b) five percent of the aggregate value, at the time 
of the lapse, of the assets out of which the power could have been satisfied.102 
So, for example, assume that a trust conferred upon a beneficiary a non-
cumulative power to withdraw the value of any contribution made to the trust 
in any year. Assume that the value of the trust corpus, after the contribution of 
$13,000, is $60,000. If the power were to lapse, the beneficiary would be 
deemed to have transferred back to the trust $8000—the excess of the amount 
subject to the power ($13,000) over $5000. By contrast, if the trust corpus 
were valued at $300,000, there would be no constructive transfer, because the 
amount subject to the power ($13,000) would not exceed five percent 
($15,000) of the aggregate value of the assets out of which the power could 
have been satisfied ($300,000). Under the former scenario, the beneficiary 
might experience adverse gift and estate tax consequences; under the latter he 
would not. A trust with a larger corpus thus tends to make it easier to reconcile 
the tension between securing the annual exclusion for trust donors, on the one 
hand, and protecting beneficiaries from adverse estate and gift tax 
consequences, on the other. 
 
 99. Id. at § 2036(a). 
 100. Id. at § 2041(a)(2). 
 101. Id. at § 2041(b)(2). 
 102. I.R.C. §§ 2514(e), 2041(b)(2). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] TAX RECOGNITION 841 
Demand powers can be tailored in a variety of different ways, striking a 
range of balances between these two sets of interests.103 Laura Long’s trust 
nicely illustrates one common strategy for protecting the beneficiary from 
adverse transfer tax consequences. By defining the demand power either in 
terms of or so as to be within the so-called “five and five exception,” a settlor 
can ensure that no lapse of the power will be taxable.104 For example, a lapse 
of Philip Long’s power never could result in a deemed transfer to the trust, 
because the amount subject to the power—four percent of the value of the trust 
assets—never could exceed five percent of the aggregate value of the assets 
out of which the power could have been satisfied. The same would be true had 
Philip been given the power to withdraw in any year the greater of $5000 or 
five percent of the value of the trust assets. The mystery is why Laura gave 
Philip only a four percent power when she could have given him a power over 
five percent. Perhaps he had been a naughty boy. 
III.  THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX (GSTT) 
The Dukeminier casebook does a nice job of showing how the GSTT 
exemption—now five million dollars, indexed for inflation—has led to the 
erosion or elimination of the Rule Against Perpetuities,105 and how that 
development has in turn led to liberalization of the traditional law of trust 
modification and termination, as well as to the enactment in several states of 
decanting legislation. The GSTT exemption allows a settlor to insulate trust 
assets initially worth five million dollars from the GSTT for as long as the trust 
is permitted to endure under the applicable state law, no matter how much 
those assets may appreciate in value over time. The longer the trust is 
permitted to endure, the greater the leverage a settlor is able to obtain from the 
exemption. Jurisdictions anxious to compete for trust funds have responded by 
relaxing or eliminating the constraints on trust duration previously imposed by 
their Rules Against Perpetuities.106 
I do not get into the technicalities of the GSTT in the basic Trusts and 
Estates course, but there is a case in the chapter on future interests that 
provides an opportunity to introduce some of the basics. In re Estate of 
Gilbert,107 which has appeared in every edition since the fifth, is included in 
the section on acceleration into possession to illustrate the adverse 
 
 103. Compare, e.g., the powers involved in Kieckhefer v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 189 
F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951), and Crummey v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 
1968), with I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8004172 (Nov. 5, 1979). 
 104. Donald O. Jansen, Giving Birth to, Caring for, and Feeding the Irrevocable Life 
Insurance Trust, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 571, 634–35 (2006). 
 105. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 895. 
 106. See id. at 897. 
 107. In re Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Surr. Ct. 1992). 
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consequences for a contingent succeeding interest that may result from a 
disclaimer of the preceding interest.108 Peter Gilbert died in 1989 leaving an 
estate totaling more than forty million dollars.109 His estate plan included two 
testamentary, discretionary trusts for the benefit of each of his four children—
eight such trusts in all.110 Upon the death of each child, the principal was to be 
paid to that child’s issue.111 Gilbert’s son Lester, aged thirty-two, disclaimed 
his interests in the two trusts established for his benefit, apparently for 
religious reasons.112 Under the New York statute, Lester was treated as having 
predeceased Peter, and the remainder interest in Lester’s issue accelerated into 
possession.113 Unfortunately, Lester did not yet have any issue, so the 
acceleration of the remainder resulted in its destruction.114 Were Lester to have 
issue in the future, they would not share in the trust.115 
The decision explains that the portion of Peter’s estate not otherwise 
disposed of was allocated among the eight trusts in the following fashion: first, 
the amount of Peter’s GSTT exemption—at the time, one million dollars—was 
divided into four discretionary trusts, one for the benefit of each of his 
children.116 Then the residue was allocated in equal shares among the second 
set of discretionary trusts, again one for the benefit of each child.117 Other than 
the fact that the residuary trusts were later to receive additional funding from 
the remainder of an elective share trust that Peter had established for his 
widow, the terms of Lester’s two trusts appear to have been virtually 
identical.118 The decision does not explain why Peter might have established 
two identical discretionary trusts for each of his children, one to which a 
proportionate share of the GSTT exemption was allocated, and another to 
which none of the exemption was allocated.119 
Here one can pause briefly to explain the role that the exemption plays in 
determining the “applicable rate” of GSTT. Section 2641(a) defines the 
applicable rate as the product of the maximum federal estate tax rate and the 
“inclusion ratio.”120 Section 2642(a)(1) in turn defines the inclusion ratio as the 
 
 108. Id. at 225–28. 
 109. Id. at 224. 
 110. Id. at 225. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 225. 
 113. Id. at 227–28. 
 114. Id. at 227. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 225. 
 117. Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 225. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. I.R.C. § 2641(a) (2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] TAX RECOGNITION 843 
amount by which one exceeds the “applicable fraction.”121 The section goes on 
to define the applicable fraction (roughly) as the amount of the GSTT 
exemption allocated to the trust divided by the amount transferred to the 
trust.122 With respect to the first of Lester’s discretionary trusts, the applicable 
fraction equaled one: the amount of the exemption allocated to the trust 
equaled the amount transferred to the trust.123 The inclusion ratio was therefore 
zero, and as a consequence the applicable rate was zero.124 The first trust was 
made completely exempt from the GSTT. Distributions to “skip persons,” that 
is, Peter’s grandchildren, would not be subject to the tax. With respect to the 
second trust, by contrast, the applicable fraction equaled zero, because there 
was no exemption allocated to the trust.125 The inclusion ratio was therefore 
one, making the applicable rate the maximum federal estate tax rate.126 
Distributions to skip persons from this trust would be taxed at the highest 
possible applicable rate. 
Once students understand better what Peter Gilbert did, they will still want 
to know why he did it that way. Why did he create for each of his children one 
small trust that would be completely exempt from GSTT, and another, virtually 
identical trust that would be taxed at the maximum rate? Why not just create 
one big trust that would be taxed at something less than the maximum rate? 
Would the aggregate GSTT burden not be identical under each of these 
scenarios? Why bother to create and administer eight trusts where four would 
have done the job? Did Peter Gilbert regard transactions costs as consumption 
goods? 
Here one can explain why the creation of completely exempt and 
completely non-exempt trusts is standard estate planning practice. Lester was 
not a skip person, and therefore distributions to him would not have been 
subject to GSTT. Any distribution to Lester of even partially-exempt assets 
would therefore have been to that extent a waste of Peter’s exemption. That 
exemption should instead be used to shelter from tax only assets to be 
distributed to skip persons. Accordingly, Lester never would have seen a 
distribution from the exempt trust. His needs would have been met entirely 
from the assets of the non-exempt trust. Moreover, in an effort to more 
effectively leverage the value of the exemption, the trustee of the exempt trust 
would likely pursue a more growth-oriented investment policy than would the 
trustee of the non-exempt trusts, whose portfolio would likely be more heavily 
 
 121. Id. at § 2642(a)(1). 
 122. Id. at § 2642(a)(2). 
 123. See id.; Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 225. 
 124. See I.R.C. §§ 2641, 2642(a)(2); Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 225. 
 125. See I.R.C. § 2642(a)(2); Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 225. 
 126. See I.R.C. §§ 2641, 2642(a)(2); Estate of Gilbert, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 225. 
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weighted toward income-producing assets. The additional trusts were worth 
the cost. 
IV.  THE INCOME TAX 
I say just a few things about income taxation in the basic Trusts and 
Estates course. For those who have not yet had a class in Federal Income 
Taxation, I introduce the concepts of stepped-up basis for bequests and 
carryover basis for gifts of appreciated capital assets. When covering the 
process of estate administration, I talk about trusts and estates as taxable 
entities, and I inform the students of the need to file an annual Form 1041 
fiduciary income tax return and analogous state income tax forms. I explain to 
them that trusts and estates are in general taxed on their income to the extent 
that they retain it, but that they are allowed a deduction for income distributed 
to beneficiaries, which the beneficiaries then report as income—unless, of 
course, the trust is a grantor trust. This prepares them to understand the 
benefits of income-splitting—of distributing the income from a productive 
asset among several (often lower tax bracket) beneficiaries so that the 
aggregate income tax burden is reduced by virtue of the progressive character 
of our income tax system—and the role that flexible grants of discretion in 
distributing trust income can play in optimizing that strategy. 
Brainard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,127 an old chestnut on the 
trust res requirement, has appeared in every edition of the Dukeminier 
casebook (albeit recently only in squib form). As its title suggests, the case 
involves a taxation controversy, arising in this instance as the result of a poorly 
executed and therefore unsuccessful attempt at income-splitting. In December 
of 1927, Mr. Brainard orally declared himself to be the trustee of any profits he 
made from stock trading during 1928, for the benefit of his wife, his mother, 
and his two young children.128 Mr. Brainard made a substantial profit from 
trading in 1928, and after paying himself a fee, which he declared as income to 
himself, he credited the remaining profits on his books to the four named trust 
beneficiaries.129 The beneficiaries in turn declared these amounts as income on 
their 1928 returns.130 The Commissioner contended, and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed, that no trust arose in 1927 
because the future profits from trading did not yet exist and therefore could not 
constitute the requisite trust res.131 The profits therefore were income to Mr. 
Brainard, and not to the trusts, when they came into existence, and therefore 
 
 127. Brainard v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937). 
 128. Id. at 881. 
 129. Id. 
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 131. Id. at 881–84. 
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were properly taxable to him alone.132 His subsequent crediting of profits to the 
beneficiaries was simply a gratuitous transfer with no income tax 
consequences.133 Had Mr. Brainard instead declared himself to be the trustee of 
specific securities in 1927, with the trust providing that profits from trading 
were to go to the four named beneficiaries, there would have been a trust res in 
1927, and Mr. Brainard’s income-splitting objective would have been 
achieved. 
The section on taxation of grantor trusts134 observes that the adoption of 
the grantor trust rules135 has complicated such income-shifting strategies 
considerably. The text discusses these rules in greater detail than I pursue in 
class. I simply note that there are certain retained interests and powers—such 
as reversions and powers to revoke—that will result in the grantor being taxed 
on the trust income, irrespective of whether it is in fact distributed to the 
grantor. However, I do take this opportunity to observe that, though it might 
appear that retaining a power triggering the grantor trust rules is a bad idea, if 
done carefully it can be a good idea. In fact, estate planners commonly include 
some such powers—specifically, those that will not result in the inclusion of 
the value of the trust’s assets in the grantor’s gross estate—on purpose. Such 
“intentionally defective grantor trusts” allow the grantor to pay the income tax 
on the trust income without such payment being deemed a taxable gift to the 
beneficiaries.136 The payment of the income tax depletes the grantor’s estate, 
thereby lowering his ultimate estate tax liability, and effectively transfers to the 
beneficiaries greater net wealth at a lower transfer-tax cost. 
CONCLUSION 
I estimate that the amount of time that I spend explaining these basics of 
our income and transfer tax system comprises in the aggregate a little over one 
classroom hour. These subjects do not harbor the degree of human interest that 
one finds in, say, many will contest cases, and they are not always received 
with wide-eyed enthusiasm by every pupil. But an introduction to these 
features of the tax system, which are secreted in the interstices of many private 
law cases, does serve to alert students in a basic Trusts and Estates course to 
fundamental estate planning opportunities of which they should be aware, to 
dangers of which they might otherwise remain blissfully unaware, and of the 
need to learn more if they are to undertake certain kinds of estate planning 
 
 132. Brainard, 91 F.2d at 881, 884. 
 133. Id. at 882. 
 134. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 978–79. 
 135. See I.R.C. §§ 671–77 (2006). 
 136. Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7. 
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projects. To paraphrase Harry Callahan, a lawyer has got to know his or her 
limitations.137 
 
 
 137. MAGNUM FORCE (Warner Bros. 1973). 
